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Abstract 
This study carries out an examination of the potential non-linear cointegration between 
the lending and deposit rates of eight Eastern European countries using the non-para-
metric rank tests proposed by Breitung (2001). Based upon our adoption in this study of 
the threshold error-correction model (TECM), we find solid evidence of an asymmetric 
price transmission effect, in both the short term and the long term, between lending and 
deposit rates. Thus, our results reveal that there are indeed such long-run non-linear co-
integration relationships between the lending and deposit rates in these Eastern Euro-
pean countries. Furthermore, we go on to successfully capture the dynamic adjustment of 
the spread. 
1. Introduction 
A central bank usually achieves its economic targets by adjusting monetary 
market interest rates, with the implementation of its monetary policy having direct 
effects on the spread set and the relationship between the operations and the levels of 
profitability of banks.  
The monetary policy transmission mechanism includes both a credit channel 
and a money channel, with the former affecting the lending rate and the latter affect-
ing the deposit rate (Arden et al., 2000). The primary purpose behind the manipu-
lation of interest rates by the central bank is an attempt to achieve its target by either 
raising or lowering interest rates. When the central bank adjusts the interest rate, it 
does so in the hope that banks will also adjust their lending and deposit rates, which 
will ultimately lead to an increase in the money supply through the monetary multi-
plier of the financial market. However, lending and borrowing are the primary areas 
of business for banks, and also one of their most important sources of stable income. 
Therefore, when the central bank adjusts the interest rate, banks are unlikely to si-
multaneously adjust their lending and deposit rates.  
Diebold and Sharpe (1990) and Hutchison (1995) refer to a common phenom-
enon among banks which suggests that when policymakers announce that there is to 
be an adjustment to the interest rate, banks may actually adjust their lending rates 
asymmetrically; that is, there may be a tendency for them to raise their lending rates 
much more rapidly when market interest rates are rising, as compared to the speed at 
which they are prepared to lower their lending rates when the market rate is declin-
* The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees of this journal for helpful comments and sug-
gestions. 
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ing. A comparison of the trends in the lending rate shows that a much greater range is 
invariably found for increases in the lending rate than for reductions. In other words, 
downward-sticky lending rates can reduce the effects of expansionary monetary 
policy.  
The asymmetric relationship between lending rates and monetary policy has 
been studied extensively.1 Indeed, both Rhee and Rich (1995) and Karras (1996) 
point to the asymmetric effects of monetary policy on output, whilst Tkacz (2001) 
also provides some evidence of asymmetry in movements of the prime rate; never-
theless, few studies have examined the relationship between lending rates and deposit 
rates. One exception is the examination of lending and deposit rates undertaken by 
Thompson (2006), who indicated that it was only the prime lending rate which was 
found to adjust to discrepancies in the spread; indeed, banks may well set their 
lending rate according to a certain “mark-up” relative to the deposit rate. However, if 
such a mark-up becomes too high or too low, the marketplace will place pressure 
upon the banking industry to adjust back to some “normal” or equilibrium spread. 
Ewing et al. (1998) provide evidence to show that the equilibrium spread between 
the lending rate and the deposit rate certificate is stationary; essentially, a finding of 
such stationarity implies that the spread returns to its long-run equilibrium position 
following a shock. If banks have market power, then they could achieve profits that 
are above the “norm” – that is, a widening of the spread – by slowly adjusting their 
lending rates back towards falling deposit rates. 
However, under such a scenario, it is clear that other competing banks could 
simply try to ensure that they were the first to adjust their lending rate in order to 
capture more customers and gain a greater market share. Dueker (2000) nevertheless 
argues that banks are unlikely to want to be the first to lower their lending rates dur-
ing cyclical downturns, essentially because of the higher risk of default. Thus, such 
risk-averse behavior by banks may result in lending rates adjusting asymmetrically to 
market rate movements (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Several of the prior studies assume 
that the spread variables, such as the lending-deposit spread, are linear and sym-
metric;2 and indeed, the variables used in such studies have tended to be linear. 
However, increasing numbers of studies are now finding that the adjustments of most 
economic variables are both non-linear and asymmetric (Enders and Dibooglu, 2001; 
Reitz and Taylor, 2008). In many cases, economic theory suggests that there are 
completely non-linear relationships in, for example, “purchasing power parity” (PPP) 
or the Phillips curve.  
It is, nevertheless, clear that the theory is not always capable of providing any 
precise specification of the functional form, such that non-parametric tools for use in 
estimation and inference are clearly desirable. The majority of the models adopted in 
the prior empirical studies (Engle and Granger, 1987; Ewing et al., 1998) addressing 
the issue of equilibrium have generally failed to take into account the non-linear 
properties of the adjustment process in the lending-deposit spread; however, as noted 
by Laxton et al. (1993), both bias and mistakes are increasingly likely when a linear 
and symmetrical methodology is adopted to test economic variables that are non- 
-linear and asymmetric. 
1 Examples include: Arak et al., 1983; Goldberg, 1984; Levine and Loeb, 1989; Rhee and Rich, 1995; Karras, 
1996; and Iregui et al., 2002. 
2 See, for example, Ho and Saunder, 1981; McShane and Sharpe, 1985; and Allen, 1988. 
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It is worth noting that in the non-linear evidence referred to in the above 
studies, the tendency has been to adopt parametric residual-based tests in a cointe-
grational approach to the testing of the relationship between lending and deposit rates. 
The present study differs from these earlier examples by providing non-linear 
cointegrational evidence on Eastern European countries based on the non-parametric 
rank tests developed by Breitung (2001), which demonstrate power in both linear and 
non-linear frameworks, and which are also applicable to whatever data-generating 
process of the variables under examination. In contrast, parametric testing procedures 
assume that the data-generating process is already known in advance, so there is 
some danger of misspecification if the wrong parametric models are used to char-
acterize the variables of interest. The aim of the present study is to examine whether 
the lending-deposit rate spreads of Eastern European countries have non-linear long- 
-run relationships towards equilibrium using rank tests. We go on to apply asym-
metric error-correction models to describe the dynamic adjustments to the lending- 
-deposit spreads of these Eastern European countries, which may serve as a guideline 
for macro policy. 
The remainder of this paper is presented as follows. The methodology adopted 
is described in Section 2, followed in Section 3 by our presentation of the empirical 
results. Finally, the conclusions drawn from this study are presented in Section 4. 
2. Cointegration and Non-Linearity Rank Tests 
As our preferred alternative to the linear residual-based cointegration tests, 
we employ the cointegration test based specifically on the Breitung (2001) time-se-
ries rank transformation; the reason for such preference is the inconsistency demon-
strated by the non-linear functions. In specific terms, in order to test for non-linear 
cointegration between two time series, yt and xt, we consider the following slightly 
more general form:  
                                                   ( ) ( )t t tε g y f x= −  
where g (yt) ~ I (1), f (xt) ~ I (1), and εt ~ I (0).  
The cointegration tests adopted in the prior studies were generally developed 
based upon the assumption that f (xt) is a linear function of xt. Breitung (2001) has 
since demonstrated that residual-based linear cointegration tests are inconsistent for 
some classes of non-linear functions (Sargan and Bhargava, 1983; Phillips and Oula-
ris, 1990). In order to overcome this problem, Breitung proposed a cointegration test 
based on the rank transformation of the time series. Such rank transformation enables 
us to get away from the specific functional forms of the cointegrating relationship. 
One particular advantage of these rank tests is that there is no requirement to be ex-
plicit with regard to the exact functional form of the non-linear cointegrating rela-
tionship. 
The rank test is based on a measure of the squared distance between the rank-
ed series. When the test statistic takes on a value smaller than the appropriate critical 
value, this provides evidence against the null hypothesis of no cointegration, and in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis of cointegration, essentially because, in this case, 
the variables move closely together over time, with not too much drifting apart. Such 
a test determines whether the ranked series move together over time towards a long- 
-run cointegrating equilibrium, which may be either linear or non-linear. 
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In his analysis, Breitung (2001) considers f (xt) to be a non-linear function of xt, 
as suggested in recent economic theory. Breitung (2001) defines the ranked series as: 
                                R (wt) = Rank of wt among (w1, w2,…, wT)                                 (1) 
where w = {y, x}. The basic idea behind these rank tests is that if there is cointegra-
tion between the two series, yt and xt, the rank sequences tend to have similar 
evolutionary paths; otherwise the sequences of the ranks will tend to be divergent. 
The null hypothesis of no (non-linear) cointegration between yt and xt is rejected if 
these tests’ statistics are found to be smaller than their critical values.  
Breitung (2001) developed the following test statistics, in which yt and xt are 
considered to be mutually series-correlated random walks: 
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relation between the two series under examination. The null hypothesis of no (non- 
-linear) cointegration between yt and xt is rejected if these test statistics are found to 
be smaller than their critical values.3 The Monte Carlo experiments in Breitung dem-
onstrated a property of superior power in the rank tests, not only in the non-linear 
case, but also in the linear case. 
Whenever the rank test for integration indicates a stable long-run relation-
ship, it is of interest to determine whether the cointegrational relationship is linear or 
non-linear. In order to identify the linear/non-linear nature of the cointegrational 
relationship found under the above mentioned rank test, Breitung (2001) further 
suggested a score test statistic T R2 computed from the following regression: 
                                                 ( )0 1 2t t t ta a x a R x eε = + + +%                                            
(3) 
where T is the sample size, R2 is the coefficient of determination of equation (3), and 
( )0 1t t ty c c xε = − +% % % , where 0c%  and 1c%  in turn are the least squares estimates from a re-
gression of yt on a constant and xt. Under the assumptions that tε%  is a zero-mean 
white noise and that xt is exogenous, the score test statistic T R2 has asymptotic Chi- 
-squared (χ2) distribution with one degree of freedom. The null hypothesis of linear 
cointegration, a2 = 0, may be rejected in favor of non-linear cointegration when T R2 
exceeds the χ2 critical value. 
The tε%  are residuals under the null hypothesis, corrected for potential serial 
correlation and endogeneity using the “dynamic ordinary least squares” (DOLS) 
3 Details on the derivation of these values are provided in Breitung (2001; Table 1). 
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method of Stock and Watson (1993). Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is 
distributed as χ2 with one degree of freedom. The Monte Carlo simulations carried 
 
Table 1  Descriptive Statistics of the Variables for each Country 
Countrya Mean Min. Max. S.D. Skewness Kurtosis J-Bb 
Bulgaria  
LR 10.412 7.010 15.430 2.144 0.591 2.154 10.564*** 
DR 3.096 2.710 3.710 0.242 0.769 3.476 12.964*** 
Czech Republic 
LR 7.169 5.540 13.680 2.141 1.939 5.849 115.779*** 
DR 2.714 1.100 8.470 2.123 1.620 4.663 66.335*** 
Hungary  
LR 11.869 7.000 20.300 3.541 0.814 2.753 13.545*** 
DR 9.086 3.890 16.770 3.002 0.812 2.936 13.189*** 
Poland  
LR 12.495 5.430 26.900 6.683 0.534 1.872 12.067*** 
DR 7.710 2.150 19.700 5.511 0.707 2.137 13.725*** 
Romania  
LR 35.361 12.920 75.600 18.184 0.402 1.879 9.514*** 
DR 20.279 4.000 52.100 14.241 0.577 1.973 11.932*** 
Russia  
LR 19.482 9.200 49.000 11.896 1.232 3.095 30.388*** 
DR 6.845 3.300 27.300 5.133 2.358 8.003 236.314*** 
Slovakia 
LR 11.852 6.230 23.930 5.288 1.023 2.585 21.787*** 
DR 7.140 2.250 18.570 4.534 1.081 2.861 23.453*** 
Ukraine  
LR 28.906 13.310 71.520 15.886 0.909 2.595 17.340*** 
DR 11.458 6.140 28.220 5.728 1.308 3.426 35.123*** 
Notes: a LR denotes the lending rate; and DR denotes the deposit rate of the one-month certificate. 
                   b J-B refers to the Jarque-Bera test for normality, with *** indicating significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
out by Breitung (2001) show that, for a wide range of non-linear models, the rank 
tests perform better than their parametric counterparts. 
3. Empirical Results 
The data used in this study comprise monthly observations on the prime lend-
ing rate (LR) and the one-month certificate of the deposit rate (DR) between 1998 
and 2007. The data are collected from the International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
The descriptive statistics of the variables for each Eastern European country under 
examination are provided in Table 1, from which we can see that both the lending 
and deposit rates of Romania are the highest throughout the sample, whilst the lend-
ing and deposit rates of the Czech Republic are the lowest. The Jacque-Bera tests on 
the Eastern European countries examined in this study show that for all of the vari-
ables for each country, the distribution is non-normal. 
3.1 Cointegration and Non-linear Tests 
The test results in this study are summarized in Table 2. For the case of the rank 
test, we compute the autocorrelation adjusted test statistics, ψ*. The null hypothesis 
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of this rank test is that the lending and deposit rates are not cointegrated, which is in 
contrast to the alternative hypothesis that states that the two variables are cointe-
grated. The null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis when 
 
Table 2  Results of the Cointegration and Non-Linearity Rank Tests  
Rank Testa  Linearity Testb Country 
ψ *  T⋅R2 
Bulgaria 0.0109 *** 8.0986 *** 
Czech Republic 0.0099 *** 2.8112 * 
Hungary 0.0123 *** 2.9137 * 
Poland 0.0126 *** 3.0548 * 
Romania  0.0097 *** 9.6676 *** 
Russia 0.0104 *** 4.1486 ** 
Slovakia 0.0124 *** 10.8920 *** 
Ukraine 0.0101 *** 2.7930 * 
Critical Value (%)   
10 0.0232 2.71 
5 0.0188 3.84 
1 0.0130 6.63 
Notes: a  The rank test is adjusted for autocorrelation. The null hypothesis of the rank test is that no cointegra-
tion exists between the lending rate and the deposit rate of the one-month certificate; the alternative 
hypothesis is that cointegration does exist between the two rates. The null hypothesis is rejected 
when the critical value exceeds the test statistic. 
b  The null hypothesis of the linearity test is that a linear relationship exists with no cointegration be-
tween the lending rate and the deposit rate of the one-month certificate; the alternative hypothesis is 
that a linear relationship does not exist and cointegration does exist between the two rates. The null 
hypothesis is rejected when the computed T⋅R2 value exceeds the critical value. 
c  *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level; ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level; and * indicates 
significance at the 0.1 level. 
 
the critical value exceeds the test statistic; otherwise, the null hypothesis is sup-
ported. 
As is shown by the ψ* statistic in Table 2, the null hypothesis is rejected for 
all eight of the Eastern European countries examined in this study because the test 
statistics are larger than the conventional critical values at the 1 percent significance 
level. According to the ψ* statistic, we observe cointegrating relationships between 
the lending and deposit rates for all eight Eastern European countries. Therefore,  
this indicates that the rank test employed in this study provides some evidence of 
the existence of long-run relationships between the lending and deposit rates for all 
of the Eastern European countries examined. 
Based on the cointegrational relationships previously identified above, it is 
possible to distinguish between non-linear and linear cointegration using the rank sum 
linearity test developed by Breitung (2001). It is evident from Table 2 that the null 
hypothesis of linear cointegration is rejected at all conventional levels; thus, the rank 
sum linearity test results for the T R2 also indicate that the cointegrating relationships 
can be non-linear. 
3.2 Threshold Error-Correction Models 
Following the positive finding of a non-linear equilibrium relationship, we use 
the asymmetric threshold error-correction model (TECM) to capture the short-run 
and long-run dynamic adjustment processes for the lending rate (LR)t and the deposit 
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rate (DR)t of the Eastern European countries. 
We apply the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to determine the appropriate 
lag lengths, with the estimated coefficients determining the speed of adjustment for 
 
Table 3  Results of the Asymmetric Error-Correction Model 
Ljung-Box Q-Stat. 
Country 
Lending/
/Deposit 
Rate 
ρ1 ρ2 ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 ρ1 = ρ2 
L-BQ(12) L-BQ2(12) 
LR 0.718 (1.617) 
–0.126** 
(-2.269) 7.718** 6.960** 9.728 6.246 Bulgaria  
DR –0.209* (–1.739) 
–0.017 
(-0.560) 8.034** 6.478* 9.060 4.752 
LR –0.390*** (-3.726) 
–0.062 
(1.1645) 7.744** 6.392* 3.872 0.0582 Czech 
Republic DR –0.077*** (-2.661) 
0.004 
(0.139) 9.241*** 7.758** 4.714 0.709 
LR –0.011 (-0.115) 
–0.214 
(-0.682) 7.235** 3.309 6.621 5.575 Hungary 
DR 0.002 (0.006) 
–0.099 
(-0.914) 6.447* 1.867 6.399 7.701 
LR –0.158** (-2.189) 
–0.186*** 
(-3.346) 8.330** 12.310*** 29.736 22.374 Poland 
DR 0.201*** (3.272) 
–0.133 
(-1.664) 8.470*** 14.242*** 29.840 24.753 
LR –0.807*** (-2.864) 
–0.202*** 
(-4.243) 13.036*** 20.599*** 32.452 10.451 Romania 
DR 0.105** (2.103) 
–0.542* 
(-1.885) 9.312*** 13.436*** 30.039 10.839 
LR –0.099*** (-3.086) 
–0.126*** 
(-2.516) 9.365*** 4.904 19.887 28.912 Russia 
DR –0.312*** (-5.246) 
–0.161 
(-1.399) 7.582** 1.730 19.433 15.930 
LR –0.300*** (-5.036) 
–0.784*** 
(-3.195) 20.988*** 25.170*** 19.960 4.827 Slovakia 
DR –1.056*** (-6.377) 
–0.042 
(-0.957) 15.941*** 16.156*** 16.961 5.738 
LR –0.197*** (-2.385) 
–0.127*** 
(-3.637) 12.464*** 3.191 21.242 29.860 Ukraine 
DR –0.142 (-0.485) 
–0.262*** 
(-2.614) 10.699*** 0.202 20.084 21.242 
Notes: a  LR denotes the lending rate; and DR denotes the deposit rate of the one-month certificate. 
b  *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level; ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level; and * indicates sig-
nificance at the 0.1 level. 
c  L-BQ and L-BQ2 are the Ljung-Box statistics applied on the standardized and squared standardized re-
siduals respectively. 
d  The null hypothesis of ρ1 =ρ2 = 0 test follows a non-standard distribution so the test statistics are com-
pared with critical values reported by Enders and Siklos (2001). 
e  The numbers reported of ρ1 = ρ2 are F-statistics of symmetric adjustment. The critical values are taken 
from Enders and Siklos (2001). 
f  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
positive and negative deviations from the fundamental value. We specify and esti-
mate the asymmetric error-correction model of the lending and deposit rates, and 
the asymmetric TECM, as follows:  
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  ( )1 11 11 12 11 1 12 1 1Δ( ) 1 ( )Δ( ) ( )Δ( )  t tt t t t t tLR I v I A L LR A L DRα ρ ρ ν ε
∧ ∧
− − − −= + + − + + +   (4) 
   ( )1 12 21 22 21 1 22 1 2Δ( ) 1 ( )Δ( ) ( )Δ( )  t tt t t t t tDR I v I A L LR A L DRα ρ ρ ν ε
∧ ∧
− − − −= + + − + + +    (5) 
where It is the Heaviside indicator, α1 and α2 are constants, and Aij (L) is the first- 
-order polynomial in the lag operator L. Within the TECM, |ρ11| and |ρ21| are the ad-
justed speed above the threshold, and |ρ12| and |ρ22| are the adjusted speed below 
the threshold. 
The results from the eight estimated asymmetric error-correction models with 
a consistent estimate of the threshold value are given in Table 3. In most of the East- 
ern European countries, the threshold model of the null hypothesis of ρ11 = ρ12 = 0 
and ρ21 = ρ22 = 0 could be rejected at the 1% significance level, except for Hungary at 
the 5% significance level. The results show that the lending-deposit spreads of these 
countries have a non-linear adjustment. Next, for five of the eight Eastern European 
countries, the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment is rejected at the 10% sig-
nificance level at least, except for Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine. The estimated coef-
ficients of 1ttI v
∧
−  and ( ) 11 ttI ν
∧
−−  determine the speed of adjustment for positive and 
negative deviations from LRt and DRt, respectively. Also, there is evidence that 
|ρ11| = |ρ21| and |ρ21 = |ρ22|, implying that the speed of adjustment is faster for positive 
than for negative discrepancies. Obviously, positive deviations from LRt and DRt are 
eliminated more quickly than negative deviations. For the Czech Republic, the es-
timation results for the TECM in equation (4) indicate that there is a larger lending 
rate when the lending-deposit spread is widening (|ρ11| = 0.390) (e.g., during an eco-
nomic downturn when the market rate falls), as compared to a narrowing spread 
response (|ρ12| = 0.062) (e.g., during an economic upturn when the market rate rises). 
This indicates that for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Ukraine, the lend-
ing rate adjusts faster with a widening spread than with a narrowing spread. In other 
words, the lending rates of these countries adjust more rapidly under a declining mar-
ket rate than under an increasing market rate. 
Furthermore, for Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia, we find that the speed 
of adjustment in the lending rate is faster for a narrowing spread than for a widening 
spread. That is, the speed of adjustment in the lending rate for these countries is 
faster when the market rate is rising than when it is declining. However, we find that 
for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia, the deposit rate ad-
justs more rapidly when the spread is widening than when it is narrowing. Further-
more, for Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine, the speed of adjustment is found to be 
faster for a narrowing spread than for a widening spread. We find the adjustment to 
be significantly faster for changes above a threshold level than for smaller ones. This 
phenomenon can be explained by the presence of menu costs. In line with interna-
tional experience, we find that lending rates are characterized by downward rigidity, 
probably due to the profit-maximizing behavior of banks. We also find that deposit 
rates adjust more rapidly to upward than to downward shifts. Otherwise, the results in 
Table 3 indicate that there are no autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity dependencies 
for LB-Q and LB-Q2 statistics of order 12, suggesting that the TECM models are 
correctly specified.  
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The model used in this study can provide useful policy guidelines for the cen-
tral banks of Eastern European countries in their attempts to establish appropriate and 
efficient monetary policies. Almost all of the adjustments to the short-term lending- 
-deposit rate spreads in the Eastern European countries examined in this study are 
asymmetric. The empirical support for this notion is that, in Eastern European coun-
tries, market forces will provide financial institutions with sufficient discipline to 
ensure that the institutions asymmetrically adjust both their lending and deposit  
rates to their long-run equilibrium levels. These findings provide clear recognition of 
the enormous differences in the banking systems across the various Eastern European 
countries; for example, it is already widely known that most banks are held privately 
in the Czech Republic, Russia, and Ukraine, unlike in other countries, where market 
financing tends to be dominant. Otherwise, the bank concentration hypothesis states 
that banks are more likely to decrease deposit rates and increase lending rates when 
they are able to exercise market power and adjust interest rates to their advantage. In 
other words, when banks operate in a highly competitive environment, they may fear 
a negative reaction from customers in response to lending rate increases or deposit rate 
decreases. In the Czech Republic, this phenomenon may be explained by increased 
competition within the banking sector, in particular after the foreign take-over of 
major commercial banks via privatization. Otherwise, the Bulgarian banking market 
is not as concentrated as other European markets and is currently considered to be 
fairly competitive due to the existence of a considerable number of private banks. 
Banking sector concentration in Slovakia is higher than the euro area average, al-
though the gap is diminishing. Concentration is also high in Ukraine due to a lack  
of competition; banks operate inefficiently with high costs and high profit margins, 
causing large spreads between deposit and loan interest rates. In comparison to the Euro-
pean average, loans and deposits have shorter average terms in Hungary (more than 
90% of corporate loans and deposits and household deposits have a repricing period 
shorter than one year). This is typical of countries with higher inflation and higher 
interest rate volatility. With the expected decline in inflation and strengthening of 
economic stability, the duration of loans is expected to become longer, indicating 
a possible slowdown in the interest rate in the future. Commercial banks in Poland 
have been able to exert significant market power over their customers with respect to 
both loans and deposits. In Russia, there is a very strong influence of government 
policy.  
Interest rates play an important role in any economy and are crucial for the de-
cision making of governments, commercial banks, and investors. The observed asym-
metric behavior can be interpreted as an indication of different levels of competition, 
development, and liberalization among the banking systems in the Eastern European 
Countries. 
It is argued that any persistent asymmetry in the short-term lending-deposit 
spread will result in inefficient monetary policy, ultimately leading to failure to achieve 
policy targets. Thus, if the central banks of these countries wish to ensure that their 
monetary policies develop in ways that make them more efficient, they must strive to 
create the necessary symmetry in the lending-deposit spread. This is why we argue 
that a stable long-run relationship between lending and deposit rates serves as an ap-
propriate guideline for macro policy. 
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4. Conclusions 
In this study, we set out to investigate the long-run equilibrium relationships 
that exist between the lending-deposit spreads of eight Eastern European countries 
using the non-linear rank tests developed by Breitung (2001). This methodology 
provides stronger evidence than traditional parametric testing of long-run non-linear 
equilibrium relationships. Furthermore, the asymmetric TECM also indicates that 
the lending rate adjusts to discrepancies in the lending-deposit spread for virtually  
all of these Eastern European countries. The evidence of asymmetric adjustment in 
the spread observed in this study supports the hypothesis that banks are quick to 
adjust their lending rates when the spread is widening (e.g., during a period of eco-
nomic downturn when the market rate falls), and it may also explain the diverse ef-
fects that monetary policy has on output. 
These findings offer new evidence supporting the existence of long-run rela-
tionships in the lending-deposit spread, with asymmetric adjustment, in the eight 
Eastern European countries examined in this study. The model used can provide 
useful policy guidelines for the central banks of these Eastern European countries in 
their attempts to achieve more lending-deposit spread stability and to narrow the di-
vergence between lending and deposit rates. The observed asymmetric behavior can 
be interpreted as an indication of different levels of competition, development, and 
liberalization among the banking systems in the Eastern European Countries. 
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